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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

INTERIOR OFFICIAL URGES VIGILANCE AGAINST PSYWAR ACTIVITIES

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Apr 82 p 3

[Article by Duong Thong of the Ministry of Interior: "Actively Struggle Against the Enemy's Psychological Warfare Activities"]

[Text] At present, along with their economic and military sabotage activities the U.S. imperialists and the Chinese reactionaries are actively engaging in psychological warfare activities. The enemy's psychological warfare attacks the minds of men with regard to thought, sentiment, virtue, way of life, etc., in order to cause us to become uncertain and misinformed with regard to our awareness, to be suspicious and wavering to the degree that we lose faith, weaken our will, give up the struggle in actual activities, etc. It is a kind of warfare that is very dangerous. The various types of psychological warfare activities feature the contents and nature of the insidious war of destruction now being waged by the U.S. imperialists and the Beijing reactionaries against our country. They infiltrate the economic and technical spheres and social life and affect the various social strata, in hopes of causing some people to become confused and wavering so that they can take advantage of that to carry out other dangerous acts of sabotage.

Not only just recently, but for a long time, the enemy have used psychological warfare as a dangerous offensive weapon. Today the U.S imperialists, in league with the Beijing reactionaries, are feverishly and continuously engaging in psychological warfare activities and ideological sabotage, and have made it a national policy to serve their counter-revolutionary strategy.

They have invested much money, selected and organized forces, and set up psychological warfare activities centers. In the past they brazenly and openly distorted and slandered, but today they carry out more wily, sophisticated schemes. Their activities are in three forms: white, black, and gray. They concentrate on activities of the "gray" variety, which means that they use ambiguous, demagogic schemes, and take advantage and distort. For example, they take advantage of the revolution to distort the revolution, and take advantage of our difficulties and shortcomings to blow things out of proportion, exaggerate, make inferences, and incite. They even bring out a few things that are in fact "true," then relate those things to many untruths to distort the situation. That scheme is used to attack elements among us who are hazy and vacillating and to

disorient people with regard to viewpoints and consciousness. They make use of all mass propaganda and information facilities, from broadcasting stations, films, and publications to such means of social communication as whispering campaigns and transmitting information orally.

In our country they are seeking all ways to bring about coordination between external attacks and the inciting of attacks from within. With that plot, they have actively used enemy elements and bad elements among Vietnamese living abroad to slander and misrepresent us in foreign countries.

Counterpropaganda arguments and insipid, lamenting, and provocative "lyrics" are being used by reactionaries abroad, who send them as "gifts" to people in our country, who then take them to cafes and snack bars and "sub rosa" dance halls, and used them as inticements to win over and seduce youths. Or else people in our country "creat" a propaganda claim or a risque joke which is published in emigre and evacuee publications, or used by the Chinese reactionaries as the contents of leaflets they spread to sabotage us.

Our enemies, especially the Chinese reactionaries, regard the form of whispering campaigns and oral dissemination as an effective scheme, for it costs nothing, is not dependent on technical facilities, spreads information quickly, and is difficult to trace to the source. Their psychological warfare activities usually concentrate on the difficulties in our economy and lives, exploit negative phenomena which occur in society and the shortcomings and deficiencies in the implementation of Party and state policies, etc., and inventing exciting news and strange stories, in hopes of making waves and disturbing public opinion and social life. They also seek ways to propagandize the a way of life that is fast, chaotic, depraved, suspicious of everything, and has no need of ideals, in order to poison the soul of the masses. The enemy uses reactionary doctrines as weapons to attack us with regard to thought, consciousness, etc.

The enemy's psychological warfare and ideological sabotage activities are very dangerous and are intended to harm us in many ways. They concentrate on attacking our inner ranks -- the inner ranks of the Party, the people, the sectors, the echelons, and even the armed forces and security forces.

That actual situation requires that in both the short range and the long range we concentrate on coordinating the struggle against all forms of psychological warfare activity. A matter of decisive importance in all aspects of that struggle is, on the basis of raising the political-ideological level and the level of revolutionary sensitivity and vigilance, create the will to resist among cadres, Party members, and the masses, and thus create a deep, broad, strong, and sharp movement for the masses to participate in that struggle. The masses must be educated so that they can clearly realize the counterrevolutionary nature of the psychological warfare arguments, and expose their distorted, slanderous, despicable, deceptive schemes. Along with education, we must have organizational plans so that the mass movement can attain specific results in the struggle against psychological warfare activities. The development of revolutionary thought and new socialist thought must be accompanied by the prompt and effective uncovering of and struggle against all individuals and groups engaged in psychological warfare and ideological sabotage activities. Organizing the masses

to struggle promptly and on-the-spot is a very positive and effective measure.

In order to have a strong, effective mass movement, all units and organs must continually monitor the observance of the promulgated bylaws, discipline, and directives of the Party and state, principles and discipline regarding propaganda and freedom of speech, and discipline regarding the maintenance of secrecy, and take steps to promptly correct shortcomings, so that the psychological warfare arguments will have no effect. Furthermore, the organs, sections, and sectors, must, according to their missions and functions, participate actively in, and contribute practically and specifically to the common struggle. They must carry out propaganda and education by means of such social information and propaganda as broadcasting stations, publications, exhibitions, and speeches regarding vigilance. On that information-propaganda front, as stated in the Political Report of the Party Central Committee at the Fifth Party Congress, "We must always master the situation, at all places and at all times, resolutely attack the enemy, win victories every day and every hour, and promptly smash the enemy's psychological arguments and schemes." Furthermore, we must promptly uncover and bring to justice elements engaging in psychological warfare activities, and use such incidents as practical lessons and increase the struggle strength of the masses. We must enable the mass movement to be sufficiently strong to overwhelm all psychological warfare activities by the enemy.

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CSO: 4209/312

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

MILITARY MEDICINE CHIEF CALLS FOR BETTER HEALTH CARE FOR TROOPS

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Apr 82 p 3

[Article by Senior Colonel Nguyen Sy Quoc, Professor and Doctor, Head of the Military Medicine Department: "Do a Good Job of Caring for the Troops' Health"]

[Text] Our Party, state, and people are always concerned with, and create conditions for, doing a good job of ensuring the living conditions and health of the army. Since it was founded, in the course of 40 years of combat, development, and maturization, our army has accumulated much experience in organizing living conditions and ensuring health, but it cannot be satisfied with its accomplishments and results. The Political Report of the Party Central Committee at the Fifth Party Congress stated that "Protecting the health of the people is a noble revolutionary mission." On the basis of developing the great forces of the people, and the capabilities of the localities and the relevant sectors, we must make appropriate investments in order to protect and gradually clean up the environment, improve the quality and effectiveness of the work of preventing and fighting epidemics, prevent and fight the diseases of society, and do a better job of organizing physical examinations and medical care." As people who are assigned the task of military medicine, of caring for the health of troops, we believe that it is necessary to make all-round, outstanding efforts in many respects in future years.

The task of ensuring the health of the army must be in correct accordance with the system of socialist collective mastership in the army: i.e., it must be led by the Party, the commanders must organize its implementation, and it have the participation of the great masses of cadres and enlisted men. It must be based on the orders, statutes, and directives in the army, and be fully understood, and voluntarily and strictly carried out, by the entire army. The ensuring of health also contributes to the implementation of those orders and statutes and to the fulfillment of the unit's short-range and long-range political missions in each place and at each time.

Only if the task of ensuring health has a revolutionary, scientific nature can it bring about good results.

With regard to consciousness, it is necessary to tie in the ensuring of health with the fulfillment of the "Health to win victory," "Health to work well," and "Health to attain good training results" revolutionary missions. The task of

ensuring the troops' health is above all a basic mission of the army. Without a spirit of revolutionary offensive, of overcoming all difficulties, especially in the situation of the country's economy still experiencing difficulties, we cannot resolve the problems that are posed in caring for the troops' health.

We must find, and organize the implementation of, scientific measures to ensure the troops' health, morale, and living conditions. The troops' health is the combined result of the educational, organizational, command, training, production, health care, convalescence, disease prevention, and other measures. Only if such measures are appropriate to the living, combat, and working conditions in the troops in each place, at each time, and with regard to each type of unit can they be effectively applied and bring about good results. The military medicine sector must serve as the hard core and truly be a staff for leadership and command, in order to develop the combined strength of the troops as a whole in the task of ensuring health.

In order to ensure the health of the troops, in the new phase, from the point of view of the military medicine sector we must concentrate on resolving the following problems.

-- Ensuring that youths who are drafted into the army to fulfill their military obligations attain the stipulated health standards; coordinating with the Ministry of Public Health in closely managing the health of youths in the 16-17 age group; promptly treating diseases that could easily spread; teaching enlisted men about certain medical tops (first-aid bandaging, sanitation, etc.).

Every year the army accepts military personnel and students to enter its schools. Good preparations must be made for that task with regard to material conditions, morale, and working methods so that they will be less inexperienced, rapidly adapt to the collective, disciplined military life, and rapidly overcome the psychological and physical changes that often occur in military personnel during the first 6 months or so. The training of new military personnel must be in accordance with scientific principles: from a low level to a high level, from simple to complex, safety, and rationality.

-- In order to ensure health, we must do a good job of managing health. Health management is a modern medical measure that is based on weighing and measuring, clinical, and outpatient facilities, in order to evaluate, and have training plans regarding, the health of each person and unit. That health management must have good quality with regard to both officers and specialized military personnel, and with regard to a number of important components in the army. The commanders must grasp the unit's state of health every day and must be informed of the health situation after the regular (annual) health examinations. In all their plans there must be a health maintenance plan (included in the rear-services and military medicine part).

-- Many difficulties are still being encountered in the troops' living conditions, but we must ensure that they have a place to sleep and that the military camps have sufficient wells, mess halls, kitchens, privies, pig pens, latrines, and garbage pits). There must also be vegetable gardens and medicinal plant gardens.

Physical education and sports equipment is a legitimate, indispensable need of the army's youths. Depending on the circumstances, it is necessary to purchase or produce appropriate equipment which meets the standards and is safe, and set aside sufficient time for the youths to exercise. Furthermore, the troops must be trained to counter heat and cold by using correct methods.

In addition to training and labor, there must be rest period. The troops must have half a day or a day off every 6 or 7 days so that they can bathe, wash clothes, write letters, read, participate in cultural activities, or do things of their own choosing, within the framework of military discipline.

-- In addition to organizing living conditions, political indoctrination, and sports, we must know how to prevent disease and accidents, and how to, when there is disease or an accident, respond promptly, positively, and comprehensively.

The structure of disease among our troops is not, in general, complicated, but it reflects the disease structure of people in the youth age group. We must guard against a number of diseases with natural sources of origin or diseases which spread locally, such as malaria, dengue fever, measles, and plague, in order to guard against infectious respiratory diseases (influenza and such infectious respiratory diseases as encephalitis, caused by a brain virus), infectious intestinal diseases (dysentery, infectious food poisoning, and cholera), and a number of skin diseases. The prevention of accidents of the various kinds (in daily life, training, labor, and in communications and transportation) is the responsibility of the commanders. That task is stipulated in the safety bylaws and is ensured by means of labor protection facilities. It is necessary to educate the troops and workers so that they can understand and observe those bylaws, know how to use such facilities, and know how to organize first aid when accidents occur. It is necessary to carefully study how accidents occur (for example, in training and labor accidents often occur during the third or fourth hour, when the men are tired), in order to have effective means of preventing them.

The prevention of diseases and accidents in the combat arms and armed forces branches must take into consideration their special characteristics. Disease prevention on battlefields must be based on the structure of diseases on those battlefields.

In preventing and fighting diseases it is necessary to combine preventing diseases among the troops with preventing and fighting diseases among the people, studying the disease prevention and treatment methods, and improving the health of the people and popular public health, in order to creatively carry out that task in the army.

With regard to officers, in addition to measures to maintaining health in general it is necessary to undertake specialized studies so that the problems can be effectively resolved.

The above are some opinions regarding the matter of maintaining the troops' health in the present phase. In building and defending the socialist homeland, people are valuable capital. The health of people is an important part of that capital. It is necessary to fully implement measures which are both revolutionary

and scientific and to develop combined strength with which to maintain and improve the health of our army and our people, and contribute to ensuring their ability to work and fight, so that everyone can victoriously carry out the resolutions of the Fifth Party Congress.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BORDER DEFENSE POST CAPTURES SABOTEURS

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Apr 82 p 3

[Article by Nguyen Anh Hieu: "Border Defense Post 73 Goes to Each Village to Grasp the Situation"]

[Text] Pointing to a map, the commander of border defense post 73 said slowly, "Here 's is! Our border defense post is small but it must fulfill security, national defense, and diplomatic missions.

I understood that all cadres and men there had to overcome many difficulties in order to fulfill their missions along a long segment of the border.

The two Military Exploit medals awarded border defense post 73 were noble awards which were proof of the work and responsibility of the cadres and men there, a group who were always united and victorious.

One afternoon -- I was told by the post commander -- five dark shadows appeared in a vacant field at the edge of the jungle. Now and then they would put their heads together to discuss something then, preoccupied, they entered the jungle and went west. That group of strangers could not escape the watchful eyes of our border defense troops. They were taken to the border defense post because they at first said that they had "come from Lan Dong to work in the jungle."

But when the reconnaissance personnel inspected their bundles they discovered five false seals, a map, a compass, and various kinds of counterfeit papers.

What was the relationship between those five strangers and a person named Hung? The "S-T liaison route?" Did the information provided by the people mesh with that obtained by the reconnaissance personnel? A plan was drafted to have the border defense post, the local administration, and the zone security comrades coordinate in tracking down and capturing the saboteurs.

The post commander, the deputy commander, and the head of the reconnaissance team held an urgent meeting. The next day, at E-Hour, our predeployed soldiers caught Hung red-handed at the border defense post. Several others immediately fell into the net.

What struck me as I listened to the post commander speaking of the unit's accomplishments was that each victory was a lesson. A profound lesson learned by the border defense cadres and men was to "form close ties with the local administration, proselytize among and educate the people in order to strengthen their consciousness of revolutionary vigilance, and fulfill all missions regardless of the difficulties."

The post commander added that one day, in district Y, no one went to the fields to produce. There was a rumor spread by the reactionaries that mighty China was about to send troops to invade Laos, take Nghe An and Thanh Hoa, and retake Kampuchea. Anyone who joined them -- especially youths -- would be treated well and would not be punished.

The cadres and men of border defense post 73 immediately went to each village to grasp the situation and motivate the people to track down the bad people.

For a period of more than a month the men of border defense post 73 lived with the local cadres and people and fulfilled their mission well. By means of fitting acts and sincere words, the men of the border defense post were able to win the hearts, respect, and love of the people. When they encountered difficulties the people went to the post to request the assistance of the cadres and men. The people were also numerous, widespread forces for uncovering the enemy. Border defense post 73 invested much effort in setting up people's security teams and in building up and training them. At first there were only 10 people but now there are dozens of people in the public security and militia forces.

Those actions created a combined strength in the area in which the troops were stationed with which to uncover and stop all acts of sabotage by the enemy in our country's border area.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

PETROLEUM SECTOR SPEEDS UP UNLOADING OF SOVIET TANKERS

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Apr 82 p 1

[VNA News Release: "POL Sector Unloads Ships Rapidly to Serve Production, National Defense, and Life"]

[Text] During the first quarter the POL sector safely unloaded 19 Soviet tankers of the various kinds. The unloading rate at the ports was faster than in the past. During the days on which ships were being unloaded the unloading rate was 105 percent of the norm.

In the emulation movement to celebrate the Fifth Party Congress, the POL ports signed emulation agreements with the tankers and, along with the relevant sectors and the Soviet cadres and sailors aboard the tankers, fulfilled their pledges and increased the unloading rate. The ports worked continuously and began to carry out the system of contracting out the unloading of individual ships, with incentive bonuses for cadres and workers, while at the same time strengthening management, creating large storage capacities at the ports, deploying rational transportation facilities, and creating conditions for rapidly unloading the ships. In all, during the first quarter the number of days needed to unload a ship by nearly half a day per ship in comparison to the first quarter of 1981. The amount of dead time decreased. Despite the limited supply of POL, the rapid unloading by the POL sector ensured sufficient amounts to meet the essential needs of the key sectors, and to serve national defense, production, and life.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

BRIEFS

YOUTH DELEGATION TO CUBA--Hanoi, 14 Apr (VNA)--A delegation of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union has paid a visit to Cuba after attending the fourth congress of the Young Communist League of Cuba (U.J.C.). The delegation was led by Le Quang Vinh, secretary of the union's Central Committee. It was received by Julian Rizo Alvarez, secretary of the U.J.C. Central Committee. It also called on the secretariat of the Afro-Asian and Latin American People's Solidarity Organization (O.S.P.A.A.A.L.) and the Latin American Students Continental Organization (O.C.L.A.E.). [Text] [OW181209 Hanoi VNA in English 1504 GMT 14 Apr 82 OW]

CSO: 4220/552

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

ARMY NEWSPAPER EDITORIAL URGES GOOD IMPLEMENTATION OF PARTY CONGRESS RESOLUTIONS

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Apr 82 pp 1,4

[Editorial: "Do a Good Job of Organizing the Implementation of the Party Congress Resolutions"]

[Text] The Fifth Party Congress approved important resolutions which illuminated the revolution's path of advance. They properly apply Marxist-Leninist principles to the specific circumstances of our country.

The entire Party, the entire population, and the entire army must devote all of their enthusiasm, intelligence, and determination to doing a truly good job of organizing implementation and transform the resolutions of the Congress into lively reality in our country.

The transformation of resolutions into reality is a process of arduous struggle and is a common undertaking of the entire nation and of all of us. Lenin said that "The building of socialism will not exclusively by a task of the Communist Party -- the Party is merely a drop in the ocean -- but a task of all laboring masses." Therefore, in order to transform the resolutions of the Congress into reality it is first of all necessary to enable everyone to fully understand their contents and transform the determination of the Party into determination on the part of the entire population and entire army. The matter of most decisive importance is doing a good job of organizing implementation, i.e. there must be specific measures for mobilizing the strength of all forces in society in the task of building and defending the homeland, in order to attain the objectives set by the Congress. President Ho Chi Minh taught that "Once a policy has been adopted, steps must be taken to carry it out well."

Reviewing the course of recent history, the Fifth Party Congress affirmed that the line toward the socialist revolution and the line toward the construction of a socialist economy approved by the Fourth Party Congress were entirely correct, but that the greatest deficiency was in the organization of implementation. That deficiency limited the results that were attained and in certain respects was the main reason for, or worsened, the socio-economic difficulties. Therefore, in order to transform the resolutions of the Fifth Party Congress into reality more attention must be paid to the task of organizing their implementation.

The organization of implementation is a sphere which demands great initiative and creativity on the part of the echelons, sectors, and units as well as each

individual. The resolutions of the Fifth Party Congress delineated the directions, the missions, and the objectives that must be attained over a relatively long period of time, during the 1981-1985 period and in the 1980's. In order to attain those objectives it is necessary to pass through a process of struggle from a low level to a high level, under difficult, complicated circumstances and conditions. That implementation lies within the over-all activities of many sectors and many base-level units -- the cells of a unified society. Therefore, the objectives directions, and missions of the Congress must be concretized in the form of plan norms, systems policies, and specific measures in each brief period of time which are appropriate to the conditions of each echelon, sector, and base-level unit. In concretizing the lines we must go all-out to avoid subjective thinking and impatience, or failing to grasp the specific circumstances or correctly evaluate the economic capabilities, which would lead to adventuristic objectives and measures which are not scientifically based. At the same time, it is necessary to avoid conservative thinking and tardiness, with emphasis on inaction and dependency, and not knowing how to develop the initiative and creativity of the masses to find solutions and create conditions for overcoming conditions and attaining, by all means, the objectives that have been set forth.

The transformation of the social economy is always affected by many different factors and relationships. To organize good implementation is to know how to overcome the localistic and individualistic phenomena, achieve good coordination among the spheres, sectors, and links, and the factors of the economic-social process in the spirit of socialist cooperation, strictly observe the stipulations and regulations, and ensure that all activities are harmonious and in balance. Management must be based on a unified organizational structure, but it must also be based on the clever combination of economic, administrative, and educational measures. In each period of time, it is necessary to know how to concentrate on resolving the weak links and the key links, and determine the over-all development of all sectors, localities, and base-level units.

The good organization of implementation is also the art of model guidance. In the mass revolutionary movement there often occur new factors and good examples of all aspects or some aspects of the implementation of the Congress resolutions. The sectors, echelons, and base-level units must remain in close touch with the actual situation and continually recapitulate the experiences of the movement in order in order to uncover new factors at an early phase, promptly disseminate and propagate them, and correct distortions.

The present characteristic of our country, as indicated in the Political Report of the Party Central Committee, is that it "is in a situation of both being at peace and having to cope with a multi-faceted war of destruction waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in league with the U.S. imperialists, while also having to be prepared to cope with the contingency of the enemy launching a large-scale war of aggression." We must simultaneously fulfill two strategic missions: successfully building socialism and being prepared to fight to solidly defend the socialist homeland. Therefore, we must always understand the viewpoint of comprehensiveness in organizing implementation. We must closely combine economics with national defense and national defense with economics. When fulfilling any economic or national defense mission we must consider whether in fulfilling one mission we harm the other one, and we must ensure that the two missions are well combined.

In order to organize the good fulfillment of the economic-social missions there must be a dynamic management structure, an effective, unified management apparatus, and a corps of ardent cadres who are capable of organizing their implementation. That requires, first of all, that the economic units rapidly transform their administrative, bureaucratic, supply management structure, adopt correct accounting practices, and expand the right of the bases, localities, and sectors to take the initiative, while at the same time ensuring the centralized, unified management of the state. It is necessary to improve planning; do a truly good job of drafting plans at all three levels -- the central level, the local level, and the base level; and ensure that each planning echelon is truly the master in drafting, balancing, and fulfilling its plans, in accordance with the national planning guidelines. It is necessary to resolutely reduce the intermediate stages; carry out a division of labor and decentralization among the echelons and sectors and between the central level and the local level; and increase the responsibility of the echelons and sectors in fulfilling the economic-social missions.

Cadres play a decisive role in transforming lines into reality. The missions of building and defending the socialist homeland are very difficult and require a corps of cadres who not only have a high degree of enthusiasm but also have stable standpoints, correct viewpoints, certain knowledge of science, technology, and economic management, and ability to organize implementation. In order to do a good job of fulfilling their roles as the organizers of implementation, the cadres must continually study, improve their qualities and ability to act, develop a meticulous, appropriate work style, take the initiative in creatively and strictly implementing the resolutions of the upper echelon, and do a good job of implementing four systems: the system of responsibility, the system of labor and work discipline, the system of protecting public property, and the system of serving the people.

Our army, organized and steeled by the Party, during the recent period has, along with the entire population, fulfilled its glorious mission of strongly defending the socialist homeland and contributing positively to socialist construction. Today, under the light of the resolutions of the Fifth Party Congress, and because of their difficult missions, all cadres and enlisted men in our armed forces must manifest a sense of responsibility, believe absolutely in the Party line, and endeavor to do a good job of implementing the resolutions approved by the Congress, in order to continually increase our fighting strength, build a professional, modern army, and fulfill their mission of defending the homeland, while also positively participating in economic construction and contributing worthily to the victorious implementation of the resolutions of the Fifth Party Congress.

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CSO: 4209/312

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ISSUES DIRECTIVE ON 1982 EMULATION MOVEMENT

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 April 82 pp 1,4

[VNA News Release: "Chairman of Council of Ministers Issues Directive on Organizing an Emulation Movement to Victoriously Fulfill the 1982 State Plan"]

[Text] On 6 April the Chairman of the Council of Ministers issued a directive on organizing a patriotic socialist emulation movement to victoriously fulfill the 1982 state plan to create momentum for the fulfillment of the 5-year state plan (1981-1985).

The directive stated that:

In 1981, the first year of the third 5-year state plan (1981-1985), the patriotic socialist emulation movement of our entire population and army continued to develop well. The organization of emulation to celebrate the Fifth Party Congress stimulated the stronger development of the movement in many bases.

Those transformations, although not yet comprehensive and uniform, have brought about good results and could create momentum for the emulation movement to fulfill the 1982 state plan and for the creation of a high tide of emulation to fulfill the resolution of the Fifth Party Congress.

Fully comprehending and implementing the resolution of the Fifth Party Congress, the resolution of the 11th Plenum of the Fourth Party Central Committee, and Directive 91/CT-TW of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee, in 1982 the sectors and echelons must do a better job of leading and organizing the patriotic socialist emulation movement, with emphasis on the following objectives:

Mobilizing the entire population and the entire army to manifest a spirit of collective mastership and consciousness of self-reliance, competing to overcome all difficulties, effectively using labor, land, capital and the material-technical bases of socialism, and meeting the needs of national defense, security, defending the nation, and strengthening social order and security.

In order to fulfill those missions and objectives, it is necessary to orient the emulation movement toward the following major tasks:

1. Self-reliantly promoting production and construction, achieving self-sufficiency in foodstuffs to the greatest possible degree and contributing increasingly larger amounts to the state, not being dependent on the upper echelon or on foreign countries; seeking all ways to replace imported goods and self-produce things which are in short supply at the central level; fully utilizing labor, land, and the material-technical bases, and implementing the slogan "The state and the people work together, the central level and the local level work together" in the spheres of economic construction, the development of public health, culture, and education, etc.
2. Reducing by about 10 percent the level of fuel, materials, and raw materials consumption and expenditures, in comparison to the state plans and budgets that are assigned. Each sector, echelon, and base must have specific struggle norm regarding the reduction of materials depletion norms and the exercising of economy, in the spirit of the Council of Ministers' resolution on absolute economizing. Bringing an end to the phenomena of extravagance, waste, exaggeration, and formalism.
3. Doing a good job of distribution and circulation. Tightly managing goods, money, financial receipts, prices, the market, etc.; ensuring the concentration of the merchandise funds for the requisition-purchasing of agricultural products and the rationed and unrationed merchandise sold to cadres, workers, and officials. Stepping up exporting and importing and rectifying, expanding, and closely supervising the activities of the socialist commercial network.
4. Doing a good of fulfilling the national defense, security, and international obligation tasks. Building a powerful People's Army that is prepared to fight, defend the homeland, and fulfill its international obligations. Building a pure, strong People's Public Security organization; promoting a mass movement to protect the security of the homeland and maintain political security and social order and safety, opposing the negative phenomena in economic activities and in social life.

The directive stipulated the specific requirements regarding the calculation and investigation of all contributions and accomplishments, such as: increasing labor productivity, increasing output, improving quality, lowering production costs, and preventing and eliminating loss, waste, and damage. The attainment of ultimate results: making a profit, ensuring accumulation for the state while also increasing the collective welfare fund, increasing the workers' incomes, and reducing the negative phenomena. Doing a good job of fulfilling obligations to turn over foodstuffs and goods of the specified quality to the state, and exercising good financial management, monetary, and price discipline. Creating, consolidating, and perfecting socialist production relationships, amending organization, streamlining the administrative apparatus, and shifting all possible professional organs to the cost accounting commercial system. Broadly applying the technical advances and coming forth with innovations to improve techniques, organizing production, organizing labor, fully utilizing labor and the capacities of factories and equipment, etc.

The people's armed forces must promote the "Determined to defeat the aggressor troops, defend the homeland" movement, attain the five goals of the campaign to "Develop the good qualities and increase fighting strength" campaign, pay attention

to heightening the sense of responsibility of the cadres, strengthen unit discipline, and improve the troops' material lives and morale.

The People's Public Security forces must compete to do a good job of carrying out the four missions set forth by the sector and of ensuring that the enemy is defeated under all circumstances.

The directive reminded the commanders of the various sectors, echelons, and mass organizations to do a good job of organizing the 1982 emulation movement, review the implementation of the emulation agreements during the last year, organize emulation agreements for 1982, create, cultivate, and propagate examples of good management, recapitulate the experiences of leading and organizing emulation, etc.

The chairman of the Council of Ministers requested the heads of the sectors and echelons, especially the heads of ministries and general departments, the chairmen of the people's committees of the provinces, municipalities, special zones, etc., to clearly determine responsibilities for organizing and leading the emulation movement, while also coordinating with the mass organizations to carry out the directive at the base level.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

1981 PRODUCTION STATISTICS OF NAM BO REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Mar 82 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Nine Provinces of the Nam Bo Delta Meet Many Norms of the 1981 State Plan and Exceed the Levels Obtained in 1980"]

[Text] The provinces of the Nam Bo Delta have confirmed that, as a result of improving the organization and guidance of economic construction and development and as a result of the impact of the new economic management policies of the party and state, the emulation movement of the provinces within the area has recorded many advances and met many norms of the 1981 state plan, exceeding the levels obtained in 1980.

In Tien Giang, grain output in 1981 exceeded the plan by 1.5 percent, an increase of 17.2 percent compared to 1980 and the highest level achieved within the area. The buffalo and cattle herds exceeded the plan quota by 2 percent. The hog herd increased by 14.8 percent compared to 1980, with the number of sows increasing 25 percent.

Industrial and handicraft production exceeded the plan by 9.2 percent and total output value increased 13.6 percent compared to 1980.

In distribution and circulation, the province exceeded its grain mobilization norm by 10.6 percent, the highest amount in the area.

The total value of export goods delivered to the state in 1981 only equalled 95 percent of the plan but increased by 75.7 percent compared to 1980. Budget revenues were collected 1 month ahead of the deadline, exceeded the plan quota by 40 percent and increased 2.5 times compared to 1980.

The other provinces in the area also recorded many achievements in a number of areas.

In grain output (in paddy equivalent), Hau Giang and Ben Tre Provinces ranked second and third behind Tien Giang Province, which exceeded its plan.

As regards the number of hogs, two provinces exceeded their plans, An Giang and Kien Giang, with the next highest number of hogs being produced in Cuu Long Province. As regards the number of buffalo, Kien Giang and Tien Giang Provinces exceeded their plan quotas followed by Long An Province. As regards the number of cattle, Cuu Long, Kien Giang and Tien Giang Provinces exceeded their plan quotas. In local industrial development, the leading province was Cuu Long followed by Tien Giang and Hau Giang Provinces.

As regards marine products, of the six provinces that have fishing sectors, five provinces met and exceeded their plan quotas, led by Minh Hai Province which completed 83.7 percent [as published], followed by Ben Tre and Cuu Long Provinces. As regards grain purchases, Kien Giang and Hau Giang Provinces led the provinces of the area and exceeded their plan quotas, followed by Cuu Long Province.

In the mobilization of grain for the central level, some provinces met and exceeded their plan quotas last year, with Cuu Long, Hau Giang and Tien Giang Provinces taking the lead. In the delivery of agricultural and food products to the central level, An Giang led the other provinces followed by Hau Giang and Tien Giang Provinces.

On 5 March, after reviewing the 1981 emulation movement, representatives of the provinces of the area met in the city of My Tho to sign 1982 emulation pledges to complete the tasks of the 1982 state plan and launch a socialist patriotic emulation movement.

7809
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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

RESULTS OF NEW AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION PROVE DISAPPOINTING

Paris POLITIQUE AUJOURD'HUI in French No 82.3.1. [Mar] 82 pp 57-69

[Article by Nguyen duc Nhuan: "The Damage of Socialist Witch Doctors and Bureaucrats in Vietnam"]

[Text] Five years after the reunification of the country under the sole leadership of the Communist Party, Vietnam is reeling before a catastrophic economic situation. Instead of the food self-sufficiency set as a goal by the 1980 plan, the farm production shortage grows larger with every passing year, totaling 6 million tons in 1980, despite rationing to the strict biological minimum imposed on a population of nearly 60 million. Socialist industry is declining, unable to meet a fourth of the basic food, clothing, health and education needs of the people. Given this dramatic situation, no one ignores the decisive weight of the incalculable aftereffects of the imperialist war or the new cycle of conflicts with China, either directly or through the interposition of Cambodia. Because of the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia -- it did put an end to one of the most terrifying tyrannies of our time, however -- Vietnam is now cut off from the flow of aid and trade with the Western world that is essential to the country's reconstruction and development.

And yet, according to the leaders themselves, there is no lack of internal causes of the blockage and deterioration: extreme centralization, leading to de facto anarchy; rigid and unrealistic planning; extensive industrialization incapable of providing agriculture with even rudimentary means of production; and an economic policy that gives priority to government interests at the expense of the interests of collectives and the workers. The series of reforms promulgated since the beginning of 1980 in the different sectors of agriculture and industry is aimed at better balancing government, collective and individual interests: the establishment of a fairer basis of trade between the government and agricultural cooperatives; higher government purchase prices for farm products; the introduction of a generalized piecework wage system, both in industrial and agricultural enterprises, in order to give incentives to workers; and temporary measures to encourage the development of the private sector in small-scale handicrafts and cottage activities and services.¹

It is not the intention of the author of this article to analyze all reforms and their real effects on the country's economic situation. Rather, the article

confines its study to a very limited aspect, one rarely taken up in a critical fashion in the publications or speeches of Vietnamese leaders, but which seems to have had an enormous bearing on the country's development policy: the organization of labor or, more precisely, the social division of labor.

More than financial management or the problem of material bonuses, the organization of labor is both a decisive factor in productivity and the principal indicator of the degree to which workers have control of the production process and their living and working conditions. The point of illustration will be limited to the organization of agricultural production, which shows how, in this rural sector scarcely touched by industrialization, the revolutionary government is going about applying a model for the division of labor in big, Taylorized industry (Leninist version) in order to promote the proletarian ideology and build a powerful working class.

Planned from the very beginning of cooperativization, full application of the so-called scientific organization of agricultural labor and space did not come about, because of the prolongation of the war, until 1973, when the party decided to regroup the cooperative-villages (300 to 500 workers) into larger cooperatives having communal dimensions (1,000 to 1,700 workers), heavily integrated into the agroindustrial system of the districts (30,000 to 40,000 workers with over 100,000 inhabitants).

The heads of the party-state saw in this the ideal solution for promoting socialist relations in order to improve agricultural production, which had steadily declined since 1959, and thereby raise the standard of living of the people and release the surplus labor and goods for industrialization and the army.

Ghost Cooperatives of the War Years (1965-1972)

In 1965, on the eve of the American bombing of North Vietnam, the party managed to include 92 percent of all peasants in the agricultural cooperatives. Actually, the major means of production (land, farm machinery) belonged to the state, but were turned over to local management committees. The party-state took 10 percent of production as property tax and bought 30 to 40 percent of it at very low prices as required deliveries, providing in exchange a limited quantity of industrial supplies. The division of labor was still based on simple cooperation: The cooperative management committee entrusted specific areas of land to fixed teams for a long period of time. The team was made up of about 30 persons who were either neighbors (xom) or relatives. There were not yet any special brigades except at the district's machine tractor station (SMT), when there was one. Cooperative members used them only rarely, refusing to pay the exorbitant cost of the tractor driver. As the saying went, "Trau den an co, trau do an ga" (the black buffalo eats grass; the red buffalo, meaning the tractor, eats chickens).

Aside from the duty of paying taxes and making the required deliveries, the village-cooperative remained in control of the production plan (what and how to produce) and the income distribution plan. By way of incentives to work

on government-owned land for low wages, the individual cooperative member received a provisional family allocation of land -- representing a total of a maximum 5 percent of communal land -- in order to help provide his own food and supply pork and hog manure to the government.

On the whole, cooperative production in the North was able in 15 years, despite the heavy drops of the early years, to approach the 1959 level, the last year of the family farm system, while making it easier for the government to get its hands on the agricultural surplus more easily. However, during that same period, the population increased 2.8 percent a year, going from 16 million in 1960 to 25 million in 1975 (for the North alone).

Food Production in Millions of Tons²

Year	1960	1963	1965	1968	1974
Production	4,698	5,013	5,502	4,628	6,276

What saved the North Vietnamese peasants from famine during the war years (1965-1972) was that, unknown to government officials, a good half of the cooperatives practiced sharecropping with cooperative members, entrusting the working of the land to them in exchange for payment, not to the teams, but to peasant families, the heads of which were often women, inasmuch as the men had gone to the front. In 1976, Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh labeled this period as that of the "ghost cooperatives."³

Massive food aid from China, despite its own undernourishment, amounted to nearly a million tons of supplies annually and essentially went to the army and the urban population.

In 1977 as in 1980, while visiting certain cooperatives in the North, the author often heard simple peasants and local cadres express nostalgia for the war years as the "golden age" of North Vietnamese socialism, during which the party-state gave its cooperative-peasants free rein. Thanks to back-breaking work on the family plot, the peasant in the cooperative could then invest the proceeds from his sales on the free market in the construction of a family house of stone or in a Chinese or Czech motorcycle.

Reorganization of Rural Space

After the calm produced by the signing of the Paris Accords (1973), the party embarked upon a vast campaign to reorganize the cooperatives, with the slogan of "promoting the scientific and technical revolution in rural areas."

In the village-cooperatives, the old structures of peasant solidarity had re-emerged and had even managed to make a major change in state policy, to corrupt its cadres. It was useless for the party to rail against parochialism, the selfishness of the cooperatives ignoring the general interest: The resistance of the cooperatives held firm. It was not always passive, but was sometimes openly violent, according to the later admission of certain regional party secretaries. Local people hid paddy production in order not to turn it all over to the government, tried to terrorize local party cadres, poisoning their

well water, setting fire to their houses, looting their individual plots. A certain number of village party cells vanished during this period. Reinforcement cadres sent from the province or capital were greeted with stonings, tired up and beaten.⁴ However, this did not prevent the peasants from taking up arms to fire on the American bombers or from going to the front to defend their villages and country.

These violent revolts, in the purest peasant tradition, were often put down. And yet, the party was having more difficulty in dealing with the craftier expressions of peasant resistance.

In order to eliminate the "negativist" phenomena of the village complicity, it then tried to broaden the dimension of the cooperative, to detach it from the natural framework of the village and connect it to that of the commune, only an administrative unit up to that time. Henceforth, the average cooperative would have a thousand homes, 4,000 to 6,000 inhabitants, 1,000 to 2,000 workers.

This reorganization of the socioprotective space had as its leitmotif a revolution in the production process, which was to introduce the scientific organization of work into rural areas. It was Le Duan, secretary general of the Vietnamese Communist Party, who in 1974 gave a strong boost to the movement. After condemning the corporative nature of the village-cooperatives, he gave the watchword: "Reorganizing agricultural production and labor in the direction of concentration, specialization and cooperation on an ever larger scale, creating socialist factories."⁵

Now the communal framework of 2,000 workers seemed too small: Large agricultural operations had to be set up, each having the dimension of a district. "In my opinion, at the current stage of mechanization, a local unit with about 10,000 hectares and some 40,000 workers -- about the size of a district -- should result in a more rational division of labor and organization of production."⁶

The current stage of mechanization has the following features: For 2 million hectares of cultivated land and 17,000 cooperatives, the North had, in 1975, only: 4,198 tractors divided among 122 machine tractor stations (SMT); 23,694 small hydraulic pumps; 9,237 shellers; 9,058 threshing machines and 1,927 livestock feed grinders. Machine labor involved only 20 percent of all cultivated areas. Other aspects of the farm production process are entirely done with manual implements: seeding, transplanting, hoeing, harvesting. On the average, two workers share the use of a rudimentary hand tool, while five to six share a more "sophisticated" rake. Stations for the repair of machinery and tools are almost nonexistent.⁸

Bleeding of Male Population


Actually, beginning in 1971, the party had to face extremely serious problems, particularly in agriculture. Not only did the North Vietnamese rural areas suffer from the frightful drain of young people of both sexes, but above all, it was bled white of its male generations between the ages of 18 and 40. Out

of a population of 1,000 in any village in 1971, there would be: 545 children between the ages of 0 and 15; 120 young people of both sexes between the ages of 16 and 30, but only 35 boys. Between the ages of 31 and 45, the ratio was scarcely better, about .45 percent. Mortality rates are unknown, kept as a military secret, but one can be sure that there was a heavy male predominance in such rates. It should be recalled here that the rural population constituted 89 percent of the total population in North Vietnam.⁹

Population Structures of a Typical Rural Commune in Vietnam, August 1970
(4,828 inhabitants)¹⁰

Age Groups	0-15	16-30	31-55	56-60	61-over	Total
Male						
Absolute numbers	1265	168	325	74	153	1985
Percent	26.2	3.5	6.7	1.5	3.2	41.1
Female						
Absolute numbers	1365	406	640	117	315	2843
Percent	28.3	8.4	13.3	2.4	6.5	58.9
Total						
Absolute numbers	2630	574	965	191	468	4828
Percent	54.5	11.9	20.0	3.9	9.7	100.0

Age Pyramid, 1 January 1971 (Estimate for a rural population of 10,000)



Even in 1980, the farm labor force was predominately female: 70 percent for the country as a whole and 80 percent for the North.¹¹ The near absence of machinery forced this mainly female farm population to use a family-type of operation. Consequently, beginning in 1972, the party promoted the scientific organization of labor among the farm population after grouping it into huge commune cooperatives of 4,000 to 6,000 inhabitants.

Plan Needs

The orientation of production no longer depended on the wishes of the cooperative, but rather, came from the district, which was to apply the government

plan locally. It would be the state, through the provincial and district echelons, which would decide "what types of crops to develop (rice, dry-farming crops, market garden or industrial crops) and to what extent, what types of livestock would be raised (hogs, fowl or larger animals) and what other trades would be practiced."¹²

Taking an overall view and considering the general interest, the government encouraged every cooperatives to "specialize in one or two varieties of crops or livestock based on its conditions." For each cooperative, it determined "the classification of agricultural branches as principal, complementary or supplementary."¹³ The principal (food or industrial crops) and complementary (hog raising, and so on) branches were obligatory and had to conform to the state plan. Only supplementary activities aimed at meeting "the future needs of the population" were left up to the cooperative members' choice: poultry farming, fish breeding, handicrafts. However, in no case could these supplementary activities impinge upon the cooperative's obligatory production.

As a result, many villages that were once prosperous and famous because of their handicrafts were forced to do away with their skilled labor force and channel it into agriculture. Naturally, "the cost of a day of skilled labor is much higher than that of farm work. However, priority must be given to crops and livestock raising with respect to the use of labor, tools and capital."¹⁴

It was also the government or its specialized departments that would establish concrete technical standards for production (amount of water, fertilizer, seed, work) for every crop, every phase of growth, every crop season and every category of soil.

New Distribution of Tasks

The commune-cooperative no longer entrusts to every group of workers or families the entire production process on a given area of land, but rather, divides the entire labor force into some 30 teams, each specializing in a given activity and including an average of 20 to 30 persons divided into subgroups. Rice-growing itself has about 20 brigades: a technical brigade for the selection and handling of seed, the use of insecticides, the application of new growing techniques; two or three plowing and harrowing teams; one or two water brigades; a team of mechanics and a transport team; eight to ten basic crop-growing brigades for transplanting, crop cultivation and harvesting. The secondary branches of the cooperative have two or three livestock brigades, one reforestation and fruit tree team; three or four handicrafts teams; and two for supplies and commercial services. Each brigade has its head and deputy, usually members of the party and named by the cooperative chairman. Administration of the commune is entrusted to a management committee of about ten members, whose chairmen and deputy chairmen must necessarily be party members. Election of the committee by the general assembly of cooperative members is formal. A supervisory committee of three to five members is headed by the cell secretary.¹⁵

Normalization of Tasks

Such a degree of labor organization can only be based on an existing ability to normalize work and divide it up into simple, identical elements, from one work process to another. The peasant was formerly master of the entire production process, completing it in all its phases, with the help of other villagers for work of common interest such as irrigation, construction of dikes, transplanting and harvesting. However, inasmuch as the nationalization of land destroyed the base on which the peasant's multifaceted work rested, his share of the communal rice paddy, it is also up to the party to nationalize this mass of traditional knowledge in order to work out a body of coordinated scientific knowledge concentrated in the hands of leaders. This must then be imposed on the peasants, who have become farm laborers.

In order to draft work standards that must express the quantity and quality of work that a worker of average ability and strength must accomplish in an hour or during an 8-hour day, the special departments of the government first of all undertook to classify the agricultural activities of a cooperative into different branches (crops, livestock raising, handicrafts and trades) and then, within each branch, to survey the different types of work (crops involve five: plowing, harrowing, transplanting, spreading fertilizer, harvesting). Once again, each type of work is divided up into consecutive periods (transplanting has three: digging up sprouts, carrying them to the fields and then the transplanting operation itself). Finally, each period is divided up into chronometric movements (digging up the shoots has three: taking the shoots from the soil, freeing the roots of earth, tying bundles).¹⁶

Other factors intervene: the characteristics of the work (heavy/light; difficult/easy; complex/simple); the quality of tools; conditions of production: time, quality of the soil, and so on.

In order to set standards the committee makes tests entrusted to a group of three or four cooperative members "of average ability and strength." These tests are times in detail in order to find "a rational structure of the time needed to do each activity" and "eliminate dead time insofar as possible." Finally, these tests are recorded and constitute standards to be imposed on the workers. In 1973, the specialized government departments set up a total of nearly 400 work standards to be applied by the agricultural cooperatives.¹⁷

Wages are based on standards and a hierarchy of work (10 echelons). An average working day of 8 hours, average level and in keeping with the standards set, is given 10 points. At the end of the year or season, the cooperative member receives remuneration, in money or in kind, based on the total work points accumulated and the level of production of the cooperative, after farm taxes and the required deliveries to the state are deducted.

For the foreign observer, there is a striking contrast between, on the one hand, the rudimentary nature of tools made available to cooperative members and, on the other hand, the extreme sophistication of the social division of tasks, which limits each worker to the repetition of a certain number of movements. Confronted with the sight of a hundred women at work, repeating

the same actions over and over in a rice paddy, the sociologist might, without risk of error, advance the hypothesis that in the absence of real machines to order farm labor, the party invented this breakdown of tasks in order to make cooperative members mimic the movements of the absent machine, forcing them into a kind of unesthetic witch doctor's dance to hasten the coming of the great machine.

Aside from the magical aspect, the pseudo scientific organization, when applied to the Vietnamese countryside, creates contradictory effects: general mobilization, the bureaucratization of society, of new work habits.

General Mobilization

By taking the skill out of farm work through the extreme breakdown of tasks, now reduced to the repetition of mechanical gestures, and a reduction in wages, the party can easily enroll in the commercial production circuit the great mass of categories traditionally excluded from it: women, children and the old. The entire female population of working age is involved in production. According to official statistics, it occupies 70 to 80 percent of all farm labor and makes up 98 percent of the basic production brigades that do not have machinery. Mobilization of children and the elderly supplies 10 to 20 percent of the total work force, of which the party boasts: "The establishment of work and wage standards and the classification of jobs have made it possible to use labor that was too old or that has not yet reached the working age (old people, children from 10 to 12). With good management, these secondary workers (10 to 20 percent of the total work force) provide from 130 to 150 working days a year on the average."¹⁸

It should be noted that adolescents between the ages of 13 and 16 are already counted as part of the category of principal workers.

Consequently, this scientific organization of work (OST), which resembles the Stalinist organization of forced labor more than it does Taylor's scientific organization of work, has made it possible to release a minimum of 80 percent of the able, skilled male work force, with part going to socialist industrialization and the majority to the army and political-police organization. As Hoang Tung, member of the Central Committee and editor of NHAN DAN, the party daily, writes: "If we (the party) had not organized agricultural cooperativization, how could we have mobilized millions of men for the army?"¹⁹

Beginning in the 1970's, the figure dominating the Vietnamese countryside would be that of the splintered proletariat. The other omnipresent personage would be the Can-Bo [communist cadre] in Ho sandals, organizing and overseeing the working women.

Bureaucratization of Work and Society

Economically underdeveloped, North Vietnamese society is, on the other hand, governed by an overdeveloped bureaucracy. The party-state is conscious of the affliction and has constantly condemned it for 20 years, but it attributes it to secondary causes: the survival of the flaws of the old "feudal" society,

colonialism and economic underdevelopment. It refuses to see that it is the so-called scientific organization that introduces into the labor process a whole host of organizers, overseers, timekeepers, chiefs and deputies responsible for making the peasants perform their task, without mentioning the "brain-washers" -- political cadres bent on inculcating in them the love of the socialist work discipline. The fact is that at the very root of the bureaucratization of work and society is the party's intention of monopolizing knowledge and power, which demands permanent and ever-increasing control of the smallest actions of the proletariat, which retains of Western Taylorism only the perverse aspect of social and police control, reversing the order of priority.

According to the constitution, it is through the "general assembly of cooperative members" that all members exercise their "rights as collective masters." Actually, as the party press admits from time to time and in an abstract manner, it is the band of cell secretaries, chairmen, deputy chairmen and cooperative bookkeepers who collectively exercise their discretionary power over all cooperative members. "In the cooperatives," the REVUE DU COMMUNISME in Hanoi recognizes, "the assembly of cooperative members is not called together regularly or at all. Specific regulations, cooperative statutes, production, investment and supply distribution plans are not submitted for the deliberations of the general assembly.... The management committee is lacking in clarity in financial management, justice in remuneration and the redistribution of supplies, practices favoritism in the distribution of work and arbitrarily hands out punishments and rewards.... Cooperative members do not dare criticize the errors of the cadres out of fear of reprisals.... As for the election of members of the management committees, party and government cadres impose their candidacies or force cooperative members to elect the members of the leadership. Voting is done by raised hands, not by secret ballot."²⁰

But it serves no purpose to criticize local cadres, to whom the party gives nearly all power over the people, in the deliberate absence of any civil code. Moreover, the exercise of power is pyramidal. The province and district exercise their proletarian dictatorship over the cooperatives in their turn: "Recently," one reads in the same journal, "a certain number of cooperatives have dared to complain about the fact that regional authorities impose production indexes to the letter with respect to every plant, every animal, bureaucratically. Without any consideration of real conditions, they force the cooperatives to grow new varieties of rice on hundreds of salty or flooded hectares, abandoning rice growing on suitable land, which is then turned over to industrial crops.... They impose obligatory delivery quotas without any relation to real production, purchase prices far lower than production costs, but on the other hand, they sell industrial articles to cooperatives at exorbitant prices."²¹

At the different local level are new castes of tyrannical, pleasure-seeking Can-Bo in the image of the national level. A survey done by the JOURNAL DU FRONT PATRIOTIQUE in a dozen rural districts in North Vietnam describes the behavior of the Can-Bo as follows: "The corrupt cadres holding key posts in the administration of the communes and districts can commit abuses of power without fearing either party discipline or state law. They use every possible

means to steal the property of the cooperatives and the state in broad daylight. They organize all kinds of meetings well-supplied with rice alcohol in order not to participate directly in production. A simple inspection tour of the rice paddies gives them a pretext to slaughter hogs and fowl at the expense of the cooperative. The slightest working visit by district and provincial cadres to the cooperative is the occasion for reception and farewell banquets, the presentation of gifts, paid for out of cooperative funds."²²

False production plans, false production balance sheets, are common practice: "Plans for the various activities remained formal...drafted for a precise purpose: obtaining the approval of district authorities in order to have supplies of materials and loans. Index figures on crop yield and production were more or less distorted in order to make them agree with those suggested by the administration."

At year's end, three accounting balance sheets are customarily drawn up. One, official and to be sent to the government, inflates production costs, wages paid to cooperative members, the extent of natural disasters, in order to conceal real production.²⁴ The other, semi-official, aimed at all cooperative members, is closer to reality. The third, kept secret among the members of the management committee, is used by them to get ahold of the largest share of the income: "Production," writes LE JOURNAL DU FRONT, "exists only on paper: paper hogs, paper fertilizer and even paper wages.... Cooperative cadres work as dilettantes, rarely go to the fields. And yet, at the end of the harvests, their families receive the lion's share."²⁵

The Taylorization of agricultural work engenders new behavior, new attitudes toward work, generalized indifference and irresponsibility, as the secretary of the party of Haiphong Province admits: "Work difficult to control was often botched, plowing and harrowing done catch-as-catch-can. Instead of being spread evenly throughout the rice paddy, manure was left in piles close to the little dikes. Instead of pulling weeds, the mud was simply moved to hide them from the eyes of the commissioner-inspector."²⁶

Most of the time, the cooperative member is zealous in applying the scientific organization of labor to the letter. Each one waits for the gong and for everyone to be present before beginning work at the same time.²⁷ Each one strictly confines himself to the task assigned, totally ignoring those of the others, despite the consequences on work as a whole: "If the bunds let the water from the rice paddies drain out, it was pointed out to the head of the production brigade, but the breach was not repaired."²⁸

In this country often subjected to natural disasters (typhoons, droughts, floods), the scientific organization of work seems to amplify their harmful effects. Instead of mobilizing to harvest before the proper time and thereby limit the damage (as peasants once did), cooperative members have a disturbing tendency to scrupulously respect the agricultural schedule set by government bodies. They deliberately leave it up to specialized teams to handle disasters and members of these brigades must always await orders from their chiefs before moving. Some years, dead losses due to this spirit of collective irresponsibility are put by official economists at 40 percent of the harvest.

The person who uses farm tools and machinery is not the person who maintains them or supplies them, whence this monstrous coexistence of a serious shortage and a senseless waste of implements. In many cooperatives, the few machines, such as shellers and power saws, are abandoned or systematically ruined in order to facilitate cheating by manual labor.²⁹ Actually, these actions are dictated by the instinct for survival: One grabs a few handfuls of one's own rice before it is stored in state granaries: "As the sheafs of grain were being hauled to cooperative drying areas, rare was the person who did not fill his pocket with grain. One could also see the women telling their children to follow them so they could pick up the grain they dropped along the way."³⁰

The truth is that the wages received by far cooperative members are extremely low and unreliable. In some avant-garde cooperatives cited as an example for the entire country and for which the government spares no investment in machinery and fertilizer, the average monthly wage is 25 dong, enough for the purchase of 20 kilograms of paddy at the official price. In other cooperatives, the average monthly wage is 10 dong, enough for 10 kilograms of supplies.³¹ However, according to certain local investigations, the worker in model rice cooperatives actually lives less well than the worker in "weak" cooperatives, who devotes much less time to collective work in order to devote himself to the family plot, handicrafts and peddling (*di buon*).

Another characteristic of the "new worker" in the socialist cooperatives is the practice of continually surpassing work standards, in keeping with the principle of socialist emulation, but by cheating. An average work day is given 10 points in remuneration, but very often the average cooperative member reaches the end of the year with a point total equivalent to 400 working days, doubling the plan goal. This is all the more paradoxical because in actual truth, the cooperative member spends only 200 sunny days on the collective rice paddies and only 3 or 4 hours a day.³² The party has often condemned this "point race," denouncing the bonds of friends and relatives which, despite the scientific organization of work, reign in these brigades essentially made up of women.

Relaxation of socialist work discipline results in growing reinforcement of organizational activities and the sending of more commissioner-inspectors, but the results have not been up to expectations, as admitted by the secretary of the party committee in Haiphong in 1980:

"This deterioration of the situation has caused the party committee in Haiphong to send more cadres to the district, sometimes as many as 100, in order to consolidate the movement. On harvesting days, detachments of blue- and white-collar workers from the city and the district have been sent to cooperatives to help bring in the crops. City leaders are trying to help the rank and file to consolidate the organization of the party and the administration of the cooperatives and to give a strong boost to the work of ideological education. But the trend toward deterioration has not been checked."³³

Drop in Work Productivity

While the new organization of farm work has released the great majority of male workers for other activities, replacing them by all working-age women, it has

apparently not yet improved the productivity of farm work despite the additional investments in goods and materials. There has been an increase in the number of workers, or rather, in the number of overseers and inspectors, but production is stagnant and productivity has dropped (18.1 percent per worker). A survey of some ten rice-growing cooperatives in one delta district in the North shows this downward trend since the reorganization of agricultural space and work.

Evolution of Work Productivity in District N Before OST (1972-1974) and After (1975-1977)³⁴

	<u>Units</u>	Annual Averages for Periods		
		<u>1972-1974</u>	<u>1975-1977</u>	<u>2/1 %</u>
Gross production	1,000 dong	36,714.6	36,272.7	28.7
Material expenditures	1,000 dong	8,600.3	11,810.3	137.3
Real production (A-B)	1,000 dong	28,114.9	24,462.4	87.0
Total workers	1 person	67,639.0	72,286.0	106.9
Real production per worker				
C/D	1 dong	414.6	339.0	81.9

An analysis of the evolution of areas cultivated per worker before and after application of the scientific organization of work confirms the downward trend of agricultural work output.

Averages Areas Cultivated Per Worker Per Year in District N³⁴

	<u>Unit</u>	Annual Averages for Periods		
		<u>1972-1974</u>	<u>1975-1977</u>	<u>2/1 %</u>
Areas cultivated	hectare	32,125	33,041	102.85
Total workers	1 person	67,339	72,284	106.9
Areas cultivated per worker per year	m ²	474	457	96.4

With the beginning of the application of these new forms of organization in the rich delta in the South, the country's total production obstinately refuses to respond to the desires of the party, which had planned food self-sufficiency by 1980, with 20 million tons of products. But it is mainly the North that is the principal cause of the country's food shortage.

Vietnam's Food Production (in millions of tons)³⁵

	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
Total production	12.0	13.5	13.0	13.5	13.8	14.0	14.8
North's share	5.5	6.1	5.1	5.5	5.8	6.0	6.3
Minimum needs	18.0	18.5	18.8	19.0	19.5	20.0	21.0
Shortage	6.0	5.0	5.8	5.5	5.7	6.0	6.2

Nostalgia for Old Ways

The new organization of rural space and work was considered as one of the final stages in a process of disintegration of the peasant communities leading to the great socialist agricultural enterprise, as one high official in the regime described in 1963: "Socialism is a modern fact of life and the socialist agricultural cooperative is a modern enterprise which is completely different, in both spirit and its forms of organization, from the traditional communities. In order to establish socialism, one does not rely on the traditional communities; one begins by demolishing them."³⁶

But the results of the OST are not at all conclusive: The continuous decline in farm production since 1959, the beginning of cooperativization, could not be checked. In 1979, in a moment of truth and disappointed by the concept of the "new man" of which he had wanted to be the principal promoter, Le Duan, secretary general of the PCV, turned nostalgically to the old ways of Vietnamese peasant tradition: "On a single parcel of land," he writes, "the peasant used to work alone or aided by one other person. Now the cooperative makes 10 or 15 persons work, but the results are scarcely better.... Working late, getting up early, braving the sun or morning frost: These were the virtues of the peasant of yore. Today, although the cooperatives should develop these same virtues through the scientific organization of labor, one no longer finds this style of conscientious work."³⁷

Nor should one seek the explanation for this difference in attitude to work in "the eternal individualistic mentality of the peasant," as is customarily done here or elsewhere. Fifty years ago, the great geographer Pierre Gourou, whom certain party intellectuals called a "colonialist mind," noted in his vast, unequaled investigation into Tonkin rural areas that the traditional peasant had a fairly community-minded, democratic spirit created by the objective conditions of flooded rice growing: "Communal land is cultivated with as much care as private land," Gourou wrote in 1936, "and in this country, one does not see the carelessness that apparently characterized the Russian peasant under the system of the 'mir'. The Tonkin peasant meticulously works this land of which he is not the permanent owner because he knows very well that in this country of poor soil, only human effort can ensure good crops. Furthermore, he feels accountable for his actions to the village."³⁸

Gourou had naturally denounced the deleterious influence that undermined these communities based on the family working of communal land: the encroachment of the imperial bureaucracy, the introduction of French law favoring the establishment of large landholdings to the detriment of communal land.³⁹ He recommended regenerating and developing the institution of communal land.⁴⁰

Instead of eliminating the imperial and colonial hobbies that prevented these peasant communities from developing by modernizing, the Revolutionary Government preferred to demolish the latter, setting up in their place vast state agricultural enterprises and turning the community peasant into a wage-earning farm worker subject to the scientific organization of labor. And yet, it was mainly these traditional peasant communities, more than the budding proletariat, which had made the victorious fight against colonialism and imperialism

possible. The scientific organization of work, set up by the party, deprives the peasant of fair pay for his work, but above all, mutilates him, makes him irresponsible and prevents him from entering into true cooperation with other free workers.

At a time when PCV leaders, planning the meeting of the Fifth Congress of the party in 1982, seek to halt the steady deterioration of the national economy and in particular, of agriculture, certain official economists recommend giving more material bonuses to farm workers (increase in purchase prices of farm products, development of allocations of individual plots, and so on). These would be circumstantial receipts of dubious effectiveness against the growing food shortage of 6 million tons a year, as long as the party wants to maintain and develop the Stalinist organization of work (OST) and of society.

Without a doubt, this organization constitutes a solid pillar of the monopoly over knowledge and power of the party. But the price to pay will be increasingly intolerable for the Vietnamese nation, with a population of 60 million already in 1981: the continuing growth in economic underdevelopment and poverty, which already classifies the country at the bottom of the LDC (least developed countries).⁴¹

There can be no other solutions than those that would allow the reemergence and spontaneous development of a living society of multiple collectives of free workers, peasants, artisans, blue-collar workers and intellectuals, with their tumultuous contradictions, naturally, but also with their fervent desire to rebuild the country so long torn by war. This civilian society would recreate a legal state heretofore left only to the party. The privileged role of the party would be to develop, along with other political forces, the contradictory-social movements instead of arbitrarily heading the nation.

Can Vietnamese society, with all its progressive friends throughout the world, still expect the Vietnamese Communist Party to be capable, as it was during two long anti-imperialist wars, of stimulating and respecting the unsuspected springboards of the people's creativity rooted in the tradition of the national peasant communities, in order to build a modern socialism of free men, outside the framework of any dictatorial Leninist, Maoist model? International economic and cultural aid is a necessary, but not adequate, condition for the realization of such a hope.

FOOTNOTES

1. See the economic report presented by Nguyen Lam, vice chairman, minister and director of planning, 20 December 1980, before the National Assembly. LE COURRIER DU VIET NAM, January 1981. Speech by To-Huu, member of the Politburo and deputy prime minister, in LE COURRIER DU VIET NAM, No 10-1981, p 3 and the following.
2. Institute of Statistics, Hanoi, 1978. "Economic and Social Development of North Vietnam: 1960-1975," pp 41 and 117, and Vo Nhan Tri: "Economic

Growth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," Hanoi, 1967, pp 293 and 426. Production includes 80 percent rice and 20 percent corn, sweet potatoes and manioc.

3. HOC TAP (Theoretical Party Journal), Hanoi, September 1976, p 20.
4. TAP CHI CONG SAN (Journal of Communism), Hanoi, October 1979, p 69 and following.
5. Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, in "Toward the Great Socialist Production," Hanoi, 1975, p 42 and following.
6. Le Duan, op. cit., p 47.
7. National Institute of Statistics, Hanoi, 1978, op. cit., p 115.
8. ETUDES ECONOMIQUES, Hanoi, No 4, 1979, p 26 and following.
9. National Institute of Statistics, Hanoi: "Social and Economic Development of North Vietnam," 1978, p 41.
10. Calculations based on information given in LA REVOLUTION AU VILLAGE, Nam Hong, Hanoi, 1975, p 54.
11. TAPCHI CONGSAN (PARTY JOURNAL), October 1980, p 18.
12. ETUDES VIETNAMIENNES, No 51, Hanoi, 1977, p 48.
13. Op. cit., p 48.
14. ETUDES VIETNAMIENNES, No 51, Hanoi, 1977, p 119, and No 27, 1970, p 197 and following.
15. LA REVOLUTION AU VILLAGE (NAM HONG), Hanoi, 1975, p 64.
16. ETUDES VIETNAMIENNES, Hanoi, 1977, No 51, pp 107 and following.
17. LA REVOLUTION AU VILLAGE (NAM HONG), Hanoi, 1975, p 65 and following, ETUDES VIETNAMIENNES, No 51, Hanoi, 1977, pp 126-127.
18. ETUDES VIETNAMIENNES, No 51, Hanoi, 1977, p 102.
19. TAP CHI CONGSAN, 1978, No 2, p 16.
20. TAP CHI CONGSAN, Hanoi, No 1, 1979, p 55 and following.
21. Ibid.
22. DAI DOAN KET, Hanoi, 15 August 1980.
23. ETUDES VIETNAMIENNES, Hanoi, 1977, No 51, p 181.

24. NGHIEN CUU KINH TE (Economic Studies), 1980, No 6, p 11.
25. DAI DOAN KET, 15 August 1980.
26. LE COURRIER DU VIETNAM, Hanoi, 1981, No 2, p 12.
27. ETUDES ECONOMIQUES, Hanoi, 1980, No 6, p 13.
28. LE COURRIER DU VIETNAM, ibid.
29. ETUDES ECONOMIQUES, op. cit., p 19.
30. LE COURRIER DU VIETNAM, ibid.
31. NGHIEN CUU KINHTE (Economic Studies), Hanoi, No 2, 1977, pp 61-67, No 4, 1977, p 32, No 1, 1979, p 41, and No 4, 1980, p 44.
32. ETUDES VIETNAMIENNES, Hanoi, No 51, 1977, p 121.
33. LE COURRIER DU VIETNAM, Hanoi, 1981, No 2, p 12.
34. NCKT (Economic Studies), Hanoi, October 1980, pp 31-33.
35. Composition of production: 80 percent rice, 20 percent corn, sweet potatoes, manioc, taro, soybeans.
36. Nguyen Khac Vien, "Toward a New Agriculture," 1963, article reprinted in EXPERIENCES VIETNAMIENNES, Paris, E. S., 1970, p 115.
37. Le Duan: "Ve Hoptac Nong Nghiep" (Cooperativization), Hanoi, 1979, p 141.
38. Pierre Gourou: "The Peasants of the Tonkin Delta," Paris, Editions de l'Art et d'Histoire, 1936, p 370.
39. Op. cit., pp 360 and following.
40. "The use of the Soil in French Indochina," Paris, Editions Hartman, 1940, p 232.
41. Detailed results of the 1979 census remain unpublished and kept as a military secret because they would have revealed a population close to 60 million, on the one hand, and a very great imbalance in the ratio of the sexes for the generations between the ages of 20 and 55, on the other hand. Food production in 1980 was 14 million tons. That of 1981 will be a little better: 15 million tons.

11,464
CSO: 4200/39

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

BRIEFS

NGHIA BINH WORKERS--During February and March, Nghia Binh Province sent almost 8,000 workers to various localities to help build new economic zones, mostly in Dac Lac, Lam Dong and Gia Lai-cong Tum provinces. Various villages and cooperatives in these provinces have assigned cadres to these new economic zones to help build public welfare establishments and stabilize the new resettlers' daily life. [BK211315 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 14 Apr 82 BK]

DAC LAC RESETTLERS--More than 26,200 families with 137,000 workers of various nationalities in Dac Lac Province have adopted settled farming and a settled life. They have built 51 cooperatives and traded with 51 cooperatives in other localities. During the past 6 years ending 1981 various settled farming and settled life areas reclaimed 21,900 hectares of virgin land for cultivation mostly rice crops. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 14 Apr 82 BK]

MINH HAI RESETTLERS--In the first quarter of this year Minh Hai Province received 420 families from Ha Nam Ninh Province for resettlement in its new economic zones. These resettlers have already embarked on agricultural production. The province plans to receive an addition of 1,700 families from its sister province of Ha Nam Ninh in the second quarter. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 21 Apr 82 BK]

AID FROM HUNGARY--The Hungarian Red Cross Association and Communist Youth League recently sent 2.4 tons of consumer goods worth some 200,000 forints as gifts to the Vietnamese people. This shipment of goods was handed over to the vice president of the Vietnam Red Cross Association by Hungarian ambassador to Vietnam Jozsef Varga on 20 April. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 21 Apr 82 BK]

RESETTLERS FROM BINH TRI THIEN--During the first quarter of 1982, Binh Tri Thien Province has successfully encouraged more than 1,400 families comprising 7,000 people to leave for new economic zones in various southern provinces. Some 5,200 of them have been sent to certain rubber plantations in Song Be and Dong Nai Provinces. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 26 Apr 82 BK]

RESETTLERS FROM HO CHI MINH CITY--The Ho Chi Minh City Committee for New Economic Zones, with the help of various sectors, has prepared to send more than 1,800 families to certain state farms in the city suburbs and Song Be Province. Efforts have been made by all sectors and establishments concerned to ensure that the new resettlers can be at ease to participate in building new economic zones. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 21 Apr 82 BK]

LAM DONG RESETTLEMENT--Over the past 3 months, Lam Dong Province has resettled in its new economic zones more than 574 families, including 2,859 laborers, from Ha Nam Ninh, Binh Tri Thien and Nghia Binh Provinces. Lam Dong has also encouraged the local people to give part of their seeds and hand tools and other materials to the new resettlers so that they can engage in production quickly. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 26 Apr 82 BK]

CSO: 4209/309

AGRICULTURE

'NHAN DAN' EDITORIAL CALLS FOR GREATER EFFORT IN AGRICULTURE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Apr 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Ensure Victory on the Most Important Front"]

[Text] The Fifth Party Congress, continuing to carry out the lines toward socialist revolution and socialist economic construction delineated by the Fourth Party Congress, laid down the guidelines for the economic-social strategy for the immediate future -- the 1981-1985 five-year period and on to 1990. That is a period in which we will continue to carry out socialist construction and socialist transformation, further strengthen our people's political unanimity and morale, reduce and overcome difficulties, stabilize and improve the people's living conditions, stop and eliminate negative phenomena, and create a new balance in the national economy, while preparing to take stable, strong steps during the succeeding period, in order to promote industrialization and successfully build socialism.

In order to build the socialist economy under the condition of our country's economy being characterized by small-scale production, it is necessary to overcome the serious aftereffects of many long wars and neocolonialism. In the immediate future, we must bring into play the combined strength of the system of socialist collective mastership in order to exploit as well as possible the existing and latent capabilities and create a new production force and higher labor productivity, at a time when we do not yet have large-scale, relatively developed industry. The Congress pointed out that our most valuable capital is labor; that the greatest potential, one that can be exploited first of all, and the object of labor which can put to work the largest labor force, is land (including forests and seas); and that a very great capability are the sectors and trade (including secondary trades in the rural areas, handicrafts, small industry, and the consumer goods industry installations), which can be strongly developed and which use much labor. Our strongest motive force is the system of collective mastership, which with the leadership, guidance, and assistance of the Communist Party, allows the combining of labor with land, the development of sectors and trades, and the early creation of a new labor force. Therefore, the Fifth Party Congress decided that "In the 1981-1985 five-year period, and in the 1980's, we must concentrate on the strong development of agriculture, regard agriculture as the most important front, advance agriculture a step further toward large-scale socialist production, endeavor to promote the production of consumer goods and continue to develop a number of important heavy industry sectors, and combine agriculture, the consumer

goods industry, and heavy industry in a rational industrial-agricultural structure."

In order to advance agriculture a step further toward large-scale socialist production, especially in the 1980's, it is necessary for agriculture to carry out its production and distribution in accordance with national plans. Agriculture must endeavor to fulfill three missions: providing food for society, supplying agricultural raw materials for the consumer goods industry, and creating increasingly more plentiful and richer sources of exports. We must use labor and land along the lines of intensive cultivation, specialized cultivation and combined commerce in order to develop cultivation, animal husbandry, processing, and the rural sectors and trades. We must promote the scientific-technical revolution in agriculture and actively build the material-technical bases of agriculture. We must complete socialist transformation in proper forms and following the correct path, strongly develop the state sector, consolidate the cooperatives and production collectives, and encourage the correct development of the family economy. The district is the sphere for carrying out a division of labor, reorganizing production, making good use of labor, land, forests, and the sea, practicing intensive cultivation and developing the handicraft and service sectors and trades. Gradually perfecting the district echelon is an important task for fulfilling those missions.

The sectors, confirming the important position of agriculture in the national economy, have the obligation of contributing worthily to the great enterprise of developing agriculture and building a new countryside. Each sector must determine its 5-year and 10-year action programs, important parts of which must contribute to serving the development of agricultural production and to resolving the food problem and the problem of raw materials for industry. The province, districts, villages, cooperatives, state farms, and production collectives, as well as the entire agricultural sector, have the mission of accurately determining their action programs in order to fulfill their missions and attaining the greatest possible production. Victory on the agricultural front is the most important condition for ensuring victory in all the other sectors and in the national economy as a whole.

5616
CSO: 4209/311

AGRICULTURE

EDITORIAL CALLS FOR NATIONAL RICE SEED SYSTEM

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Mar 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Putting the Management of Rice Varieties on a Regular Basis"]

[Text] In crop production, crop varieties are the primary prerequisite and, at the same time, the internal condition of crops that determine how they react to the laws of biology and are very sensitive to external circumstances. It is through the variety of crop that the favorable internal factors of plants have an effect. As a result, the variety of crop is a technical factor of decisive significance in meeting the norms on yield, the amount of area under cultivation and total output.

In the guidance of agricultural production over the past years, the various localities and the responsible sectors have concerned themselves with resolving the problem of rice varieties from both perspectives: providing an adequate supply of good varieties to meet the needs of intensive cultivation, multicropping and the expansion of the amount of area under cultivation; and, during each season, insuring that all land is put under cultivation in exact accordance with production techniques, even in years of natural disasters.

Over the past 20 years, together with the campaign to establish the new production relations in the rural areas of the North and gradually introduce technological advances in crop production, we have gradually replaced old, low yield varieties with new, short-term, high yield varieties. In recent years, the reorganization of the structure of production and the reallocation of varieties have brought about changes of a revolutionary nature in fields. The yields of the new varieties are, on the average, 50 to 100 percent higher than the yields of the old varieties of rice. The replacement of the majority of the 5th month rice season with spring rice together with the expansion of the early 10th month rice crop have permitted the cultivation of winter crops in the North and increased grain production by nearly 1 million tons. In the South, new, short-term varieties of rice have permitted the cultivation of a winter-spring rice crop and a summer-fall rice crop on nearly 1 million hectares, with yields exceeding those of 10th month rice. Varieties of rice that are susceptible to planthoppers have been replaced with rice varieties that are resistant to planthoppers in order to eventually exterminate a pest that has caused heavy damage in fields for many years.

The widespread use of flexible forms of seedling cultivation (yard-grown seedlings, direct sowing and so forth) utilizing varieties of rice that can be transplanted late has insured successful production amidst complex weather changes.

However, work with crop varieties is still marked by many shortcomings and weaknesses that must be resolved.

The largest problem is that many varieties, including "first-line" main crop varieties have degenerated. Varieties have become mixed, the purity of varieties has declined, rice plants head at many different levels in fields, the sprouting ability of rice plants is poor and there has been a marked decline in yield, quality and the weight of rice grains, thereby causing a large waste of seed paddy. It has been estimated that the damage caused by poor quality seed paddy on a nationwide basis amounts to 980,000 tons per year.

The main cause of these problems are the many loopholes and weaknesses in the organization and management of varieties. Many new varieties have been put into production without the permission of the authorized agency and without being researched and tested. Anyone has the right to introduce a variety, to name a variety and anyone can put into production varieties that are not consistent with local natural conditions as well as varieties that contain the origins of pests. Many good varieties that have been put into production have degenerated within the space of a few years as a result of not being properly maintained, stored or strengthened. As regards organization, there is no unified, tight system of crop variety management nor have the necessary policies been adopted to insure that work with varieties proceeds smoothly.

In order to meet the requirement of developing grain production in the years ahead, putting work with varieties, primarily varieties of rice, on a regular basis is a pressing task. Of all the measures that must be taken in a well coordinated manner (from ideological measures to measures regarding organization, policy, technology and management), the need to establish unified management of work with varieties through the formation of a national rice seed system is the measure of greatest importance and most decisive significance, is a measure that has a positive impact upon all the other measures employed in this work.

The four-level rice seed production system consists of:

- The seed production agencies on the central level that produce primarily hybrid seed and some level I seed for reserve.
- The seed production agencies on the provincial level which receive hybrid seed from the central level to produce level I seed.
- In the districts, the cooperatives specializing in seed production which receive level I seed in order to produce level II seed.
- All other agricultural cooperatives organize seed units and receive level II seed for the production of an adequate supply of level III seed for the cooperative.

The provinces of Thai Binh, Ha Nam Ninh, Ha Son Binh and Ha Bac as well as Hanoi are rapidly shifting from the old rice seed system to the new, progressive form of organization.

The four-level rice seed system has the following advantage: it reduces the amount of area under cultivation and the quantity of seed of the central, provincial and district seed production agencies by at least two or three times compared to previously. In the past, cooperatives had to transport 40 to 50 tons of paddy each season in exchange for a large quantity of seed paddy but were still unable to put all of their land under cultivation; now, they need only transport 2 or 3 tons of level II seed paddy to produce seed on 25 to 30 hectares.

This method reduces costs, is consistent with our overall capabilities in the construction of material bases, the level of management and the level of technology and insures the production of good seed to meet the requirements of production. Cooperatives that are unable to organize seed units can select a good production unit that has stable production conditions and good cropland to produce seed for the cooperative. The widespread use of final product contracts with laborers should be encouraged on all seed production levels.

The localities, production installations and responsible sectors should try to rapidly put the work involved in rice varieties on a regular basis and insure that there is enough good seed to transplant all land in exact accordance with techniques during the various production seasons in all areas. Of utmost importance is the need to complete the establishment of the national rice seed system in order to unify the management of seed from the central level to the production installations on a nationwide scale.

7809
CSO: 4209/296

AGRICULTURE

REPORT ON COPING WITH TYPHOONS, FLOODS

BK170506 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 16 Apr 82

[NHAN DAN 17 April editorial: "Stand Ready To Cope With Typhoons and Floods"]

[Text] According to forecasts by the water conservancy, hydrological and meteorological sectors, more rains, typhoons and floods are possible this year than in previous years. There will be many depressions which could develop into typhoons in the South China Sea.

This year, our people must stand ready to cope with possible flash floods and typhoons, especially major floods similar to those in previous years. Dike and embankment systems are the most important projects in controlling floods and flash floods and must be maintained in good condition even in adverse weather.

In coping with natural calamities, the better prepared we are to cope with the worst possible events, the more likely we will be able to actively prevent and minimize damage.

Planning for prevention and control of floods and typhoons can be divided into three stages, namely the stages of consolidating material and technical bases, inspecting and being alert. If these stages are carried out carefully, we can then deal promptly with various natural calamities.

In vast areas, besides the general, natural conditions there are unique local conditions. As a result, it is necessary to design appropriate preventive measures for each locality.

Northern provinces with dike and embankment systems to control flash floods, especially the Red River floods, have sustained no major flash floods over the past decade. Many sections of the Red River bed have become clogged, preventing the smooth flow of its currents. Dikes and embankments have many cracks and other damage not completely discovered and repaired.

The strengthening of dikes and embankments in the northern provinces must be completed before the "Tieu Man" [Tieu Man--eighth solar term, 28 May-6 June) flash floods or before 21 May. Inspections must be made and dikes, embankments and sluices closely controlled and plans formulated to

strengthen and repair these systems promptly. Due to limited material and technical facilities, these provinces must concentrate manpower early to strengthen and repair sections of various key dikes and embankments.

The southern provinces, with fewer dikes, experience flash floods every year in both the central and southeast Nam Bo regions and the Mekong River delta area. These regions must pay attention to prevention and control of flash floods and early floods. They should promptly plant summer-fall and 10th month rice crops with short-term rice varieties. Summer-fall rice should be planted earlier to permit harvesting before 15 August, especially in upper river areas. This task must be carried out along with the building of embankments in areas with favorable conditions to control early flash floods. In order to protect the people's lives and property, it is necessary to guide and encourage those living in riverbank areas to build embankments and raise their ground floors, build boats for the people and organizations, protect roads and bridges and prevent flash floods and landslides which may cause damage, especially to Route No 1 and the Thong Nhat railroad.

Because of tree-felling practices, mountainous localities must prepare themselves to cope with flash floods in order to protect lakes and dams. Tasks concerning the collection of information for hydrological and meteorological forecasts directly help in the struggle to fight natural calamities. All antityphoon and flood facilities and equipment must be fully maintained according to plan and at fixed places, especially at critical places. All flood control forces must be fully organized and carefully trained including dike management teams and emergency rescue units. Regulations on dike building and other water conservancy projects must be implemented scrupulously throughout the typhoon season. Unusual phenomena must be discovered promptly and preventive measures must be taken quickly.

To prevent and control typhoons and floods urgently is an important task which directly guarantees success in carrying out the economic and social tasks set forth by the Fifth VCP Congress, especially the production of grain and food and protection of the people's lives and property. These tasks are the obligation of the entire party, people, armed forces and state.

CSO: 4209/309

AGRICULTURE

BRIEFS

RUBBER PLANTATIONS--Various rubber corporations and plantations in localities are making preparations to plant an additional 11,600 hectares of rubber trees in 1982 or 100 percent more than the previous year. The Phu Rieng, Dong Nai, Dau Tieng, Binh Long, Phuoc Hoa and Dong Phu rubber corporations have been assigned by the rubber general department to plant new rubber trees. They have prepared soil and set up planting pattern to fulfill their assigned task. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 14 Apr 82 BK]

NORTH GRAIN REPORT--As of 10 April 1982, the northern provinces and municipalities had delivered to state granaries 76.2 percent of the overall grain procurement target set for the 10th-month crop season of 1981. Specifically, the 95 percent of the norm for grain obligation was fulfilled; for the collection of agricultural tax, 93 percent; and for non-obligatory grain purchases, 56 percent. Eleven provinces and municipalities--including Hanoi, Haiphong, Ha Nam Ninh, Ha Son Binh, Thanh Hoa, Ha Bac, Nghe Tinh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Hoang Lien Son and Son La--together with 111 districts and 3,528 cooperatives overfulfilled their grain obligation quotas. Hanoi and Hoang Lien Son overfulfilled the overall grain procurement quotas for the 10th-month crop season of 1981 by 7.2 and 3.1 percent respectively. [Text] [BK180600 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 16 Apr 82]

QUANG NAM-DA NANG WINTER-SPRING RICE--Quang Nam-da Nang Province to date has harvested more than 18,000 hectares of winter-spring rice. On the average the rice yield is higher than the previous years. Dai Loc District harvested an average yield of 45 quintals per hectare. Along with the harvest work the province is preparing land and equipment for the spring-summer rice crop. [BK211315 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 17 Apr 82 BK]

LONG AN WINTER-SPRING RICE--Long An Province as of mid-April had harvested almost 30,000 hectares of winter-spring rice, achieving more than 93 percent of the planted area. The province has also plowed almost 15,000 hectares of ricefields for summer-fall and 10th-month rice crops. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 20 Apr 82 BK]

TIEN GIANG WINTER-SPRING RICE--Tien Giang Province has harvested more than 45,000 hectares of winter-spring rice with an average yield of 26-30 quintals per hectare. The province in early days of April plowed more than 10,000 hectares of ricefields for the summer-fall and the 10th-month rice crops. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 20 Apr 82 BK]

BEN TRE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION--The People's Council of Ben Tre Province recently held a meeting to review the implementation of the 1981 state plan and discuss guidelines and tasks for 1982, especially measures to improve the people's daily life. The province is striving to produce, for this year's plan norms, 330,000 tons of grain plant 36,000 hectares of coconut, catch 24,000 tons of fish and shrimp, raise 130,000 hogs and improve circulation and distribution. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 15 Apr 82 BK]

CUU LONG GRAIN OBLIGATION--During 8-14 April, Cuu Long Province collected and purchased an additional of more than 2,000 tons of paddy, bringing the total amount of grain obligation since the early crop to 85,000 tons or 85 percent of the plan norms for winter-spring crop. Dung Liem, Long Hoa and Tam Binh districts took the lead in grain obligation tasks. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 21 Apr 82 BK]

CUU LONG GRAIN OBLIGATIONS--Cuu Long Province to date has purchased and collected 90,000 tons of grain, achieving 90 percent of plan norms for the 10th-month and winter-spring crops. The province is striving to fulfill its 100,000 tons plan norm for these two crops. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 28 Apr 82 BK]

CSO: 4209/310

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

BRIEFS

CDR-BUILT NICKEL PLATING FACTORY—A CDR-built nickel plating factory has been commissioned recently in Haiphong Municipality to commemorate the 1 May international labor day and the 30 April victory day. This factory has been equipped with modern device and equipment which can plate up to 120,000 square meters of metal surface annually. [BK030605 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 1 May 82 BK]

CSO: 4209/310

LIGHT INDUSTRY

'NHAN DAN' EDITORIAL CALLS FOR INCREASED CONSUMER GOODS PRODUCTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Apr 82 pp 1,4

[Editorial: "Develop the Production of Consumer Goods"]

[Text] The Fifth Party Congress pointed out that in the immediate future the principal contents of socialist industrialization will be to concentrate on strongly developing agriculture, regard agriculture as the most important front, advance agriculture a step further toward large-scale socialist production, promote the production of consumer goods, continue to develop a number of important heavy industry sectors, and combine agriculture, the consumer goods industry, and heavy industry in a rational industrial-agricultural structure. The development of the consumer goods is tied in with the development of agriculture and heavy industry in the following order: agriculture-consumer goods industry-heavy industry, which is the rational structure for the present course of socialism. The reciprocal effects exerted by those three components of the national economy are very closely intertwined and stimulate one another. The development of one component is a precondition for the other components, and the leading component is agriculture. That is a correct economic policy for exploiting our economic capabilities as well as possible, for meeting the urgent requirements, forming a rational economic structure, and creating conditions for rapidly accumulating capital for industrialization. To promote the production of consumer goods is to increase the value of agricultural products, stimulate agricultural production, expand the division of labor, create additional jobs, develop the economy, and increase labor productivity and the national income.

Our consumer goods industry is not yet large, but its existing capabilities, and especially its exploitable potential, are considerable. In our country there are tens of thousands of consumer goods production installations, including the food industry, light industry, small industry, and handicrafts, not to mention large numbers of individual handicraft workers and the secondary family economy. Many heavy industry installations and even national defense industry installations are also capable of producing consumer goods. Our country has rich natural resources, has a plentiful supply of labor, has traditional sectors and trades, and has a skilled corps of handicraft workers. Although those production forces have different technical levels and organisational scales, they are forces with noteworthy capabilities to create rich sources of consumer goods. Those forces have not yet been developed to the maximum. For many different reasons, part of the production capacity has not yet been well utilized. Some enterprises have not

operated at full capacity because they lack materials, raw materials, and energy. Other installations have not been able to determine their production direction, product line, or commercial mode. Although the bureaucratic-supply type of management has been partly overcome, it still exerts a negative influence on production in many localities and bases.

In order to promote the production of consumer goods it is necessary to reorganize production and improve management, so that we can effectively develop all existing production capabilities of the economic components; use all technical levels, from mechanized and semimechanized to handicrafts; and utilize all appropriate organizational forms -- state, collective, and individual -- on all scales: large, medium, and small. As pointed out in the Congress documents, we must inventory and categorize all sectors and trades, carry out rational division of labor and cooperation throughout the nation, develop all capabilities of central industry, local industry, small industry, and handicrafts, and use every individual handicrafts, worker to develop production in the large municipalities and cities and in the rural areas. All-out attention must be paid to developing the strengths with regard to consumer goods production of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hai Phong, Da Nang, Viet Tri, Nam Dinh, etc. There must be an alliance among state, cooperative, and individual bases in order to promote the production of each product. In the immediate future, attention must be paid to doing a good job of resolving problems regarding investment, the increasing of technical equipment, the improvement of techniques, the production and supplying of raw materials, and the use of economic levers, and appropriate incentives for collectives and individual workers, in order to strongly develop small industry and handicrafts, both the traditional sectors and trades and the new sectors and trades.

Promoting the production of consumer goods is a mission of the production sectors and of society as a whole. Wherever there are needs and specific material conditions, the production of goods to meet the needs for food, clothing, housing, travel, study, and medical treatment, and of goods essential for daily life, must be organized. The above-mentioned policies and directions regarding the production of consumer goods must become a major mission and a major part of the economic-social programs of each base-level unit, district, precinct, province, municipality, and industrial sector in the second phase of the party organization congresses or the sector cadre conferences. Each sector and locality must endeavor to develop its existing and latent capabilities in order to draft plans, organize production, and contribute to meeting the common needs of society, while also creating increasingly larger quantities of export goods.

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CSO: 4209/311

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

BRIEFS

SOVIET LIGHTNING RESEARCH EQUIPMENT--Moscow, 1 April--A set of Soviet-made research equipment for the study of lightning has been sent to Vietnam, writes MOSCOW NEWS. It will help in the photographing and measuring of electrical discharges and also in forecasting the path of thunderstorms. Vietnam is situated in one of the most storm-prone areas of the earth, and thunderbolts inflict considerable damage. They account for 70 percent of the damage to power lines. The Vietnamese meteorologists, assisted by their Soviet counterparts, will locate the areas where thunderbolts strike most often, and will take the necessary protective measures.--NAB/TASS [Text] [Rangoon THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY in English 3 Apr 82 p 7]

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